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ABSTRACT 
Scholars and pundits have long debated whether religion helps new immigrants integrate 
politically in the United States. Those who see religion as an integrative institution cite the 
country’s history of vibrant religious congregationalism that supports connections between the 
native and foreign born, while critics point to anti-immigrant hostility, Christian nationalism, 
and patterns of religious membership that can reinforce social segregation. This article aims to 
adjudicate this debate, using a large sample of survey data, the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), 
fielded among new legal residents in 2003/2004. I find that religious membership is associated 
with increased probability of naturalizing in a short (3.5-7 year) timeframe and is stronger for 
those with greater human capital and income and longer tenure in the United States. 
Involvement in US-origin congregations also exhibits a stronger effect on naturalization than 
involvement in national-origin congregations. Additionally, I find that religious minorities, 
though less likely to be members of congregations, are independently more likely than 
Christian immigrants to naturalize in the same timeframe. These results are interpreted as 
support for a view of organized religion as a setting for American identity formation and a 
basis for mobilizing resources in response to anti-immigrant sentiment. For certain groups, 
organized religion seems to support a type of selective acculturation that combines American 
citizenship with the establishment and/or retention of a distinct ethno-religious identity. The 
article thus affirms, with caveats, the broader relevance of a long tradition of ethnographic 
scholarship on immigrant religion in the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Religion has often played a role in the formation of new citizens, though how and why vary 
around the world (Özev 2017; Foner and Alba 2008; Alba 2005; Searle-Chatterjee 2000). In 
the United States, both native- and foreign-born populations exhibit generally high levels of 
religious involvement and are majority Christian, despite fears of immigration changing the 
country’s religious character (Sherkat and Lehman 2018; Braunstein 2017; Massey and 
Sánchez 2010). Many scholars therefore consider religion a uniquely unifying force in US 
history (Warner 1997; Herberg 1983; Gordon 1964), one that integrates new immigrants by 
providing social capital and facilitating American identity formation. Yet others question this 
narrative, saying it ignores racial and ethnic segregation in the religious sphere, the rise in 
Christian nationalism, and the hostility experienced by immigrants and religious minorities, 
including Jews, Buddhists, and Catholics in earlier eras (Albanese 2012:302-316; Breton 
1964). 
 This debate reflects the wider contention over immigration and increasing formal and 
informal restrictions on naturalization in the United States (Massey and Sánchez 2010; Hagan, 
Eschbach, and Rodriguez 2008). The United States now lags behind Canada in rates of 
naturalization among foreign-born residents (Bloemraad 2002). The relative share of 
naturalized citizens among the foreign-born population in the United States has also decreased 
relative to those in more vulnerable legal categories (Massey and Bartley 2005). Furthermore, 
there is a widening gap between highly educated, upwardly mobile immigrant professionals 
and economically vulnerable laborers and their families (Portes and Rumbaut 2014:266-269), a 
distinction reflected in increasingly unequal assimilation outcomes (Portes 2007; Warner 2007; 
Portes and Rumbaut 2001). 
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 In this context, it is especially important to understand why certain immigrants are 
more likely to obtain citizenship and whether religion supports this process. Qualitative studies 
from the United States have shown how religious membership can assist new immigrants in 
political integration (Cadge et al. 2013; Foner and Alba 2008; Levitt 2008; Foley and Hoge 
2007; Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004). Yet we know less about whether religious 
membership shapes naturalization at the broader population level and how it plays out for an 
increasingly unequal immigrant population.  
This article addresses these questions, using survey data from immigrants who obtained 
legal permanent residency in the early 2000s, The New Immigrant Survey (NIS). Using this 
dataset, I evaluate the evidence for four explanatory frameworks of religious-based integration: 
social capital, identity formation, minority segregation, and minority mobilization theories. I 
also provide a statistical description of immigrant involvement in organized religion at the 
population level and among major ethno-religious subgroups, showing how involvement in 
organized religion works in tandem with human capital and income. In this way, this article 
contributes to the debate between those that view American religion as an integrative 
institution and those who see it as a basis of anti-immigrant hostility and social segregation.   
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Citizenship as Political Resource 
United States citizenship has traditionally been viewed as a benchmark of immigrant political 
integration (Portes and Rumbaut 2014:183-191; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; Gordon 1964). It 
is a formal change in legal status granting rights and responsibilities of national membership, 
including voting rights, legal protections, access to social welfare benefits, and special 
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consideration for sponsoring the resettlement of family members to the United States. It is also 
a meaningful symbol of commitment to the host country, as an intensive process culminating in 
a pledge of allegiance to the new nation (Bueker 2005; Massey and Bartley 2005).  
 However, as transnationalism, the state of being simultaneously embedded in two 
different national societies (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004), is increasingly recognized as a 
modal condition of foreign-born residents (Gershon and Pantoja 2014; Soehl and Waldinger 
2012; Guarnizo 2003), scholars have begun to conceive of US citizenship more as a political 
resource. They find that immigrants often pursue naturalization because of the privileges it 
affords, such as moving more easily between borders or sponsoring the resettlement of 
relatives, even while they maintain political, social, and cultural ties to one, or even multiple, 
other nations (Gershon and Pantoja 2014; Massey and Akresh 2011; Guarnizo 2003; 
Gilbertson and Singer 2003). Access to the resource of citizenship is in turn shaped by social 
and economic factors, including human capital (especially education and English-speaking 
ability), length of time in the United States, and modes of incorporation (i.e., legal status and 
government reception) (Portes and Rumbaut 2014:183-191; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012; 
Massey and Bartley 2005; Buecker 2005). Ethnic community organization and mobilization of 
resources also play major roles in which groups more widely and successfully pursue 
citizenship (Bloemraad 2006). 
Scholars also find that immigrants to the US are increasingly bifurcated into two 
groups: upwardly mobile, highly educated professionals and economically vulnerable, less-
educated workers (Portes and Rumbaut 2014:266-269). Those in the latter group face greater 
material obstacles to naturalization: their skills are less valued in the labor market (Hagan, 
Hernandez-Leon, and Demonsant 2015); they usually have less human capital (i.e., English-
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speaking ability, formal education) to aid in the naturalization process (Gershon and Pantoja 
2014; Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012); and they often start their migration trajectory from liminal 
or vulnerable legal positions (Portes 2007; Menjivar 2006). Yet while more privileged migrants 
may not face such obstacles, they are not necessarily more likely to become citizens because 
they may see their time in the United States as temporary and strategic (Massey and Akresh 
2006). Those with economic and occupational privilege are also better situated to resist 
permanent resettlement for cultural reasons, such as fear of racialized assimilation for their 
children (Bledsoe and Sow 2011; Waters 1999).  
What the above discussion suggests is that social institutions such as organized religion 
may be important for these two groups’ citizenship pathways for different reasons. Religious 
organizations may help less-privileged immigrants to the extent that such organizations provide 
access to new resources to overcome material obstacles, while they may be influential for 
immigrants with greater privilege to the extent that these institutions shape cultural 
identification with US society. To date, this possibility of divergent roles for religious 
organizations has not been systematically tested, although it is clear that ethnic community 
organizations generally function differently for groups with different levels of social and 
political privilege (Portes 2007, 1998; Warner 2007; Bloemraad 2006; Massey and Akresh 
2006; Rudrappa 2004). It is therefore important for any study of religion’s role in immigrant 
political incorporation to account for these distinctions between socioeconomic groups and the 
different processes that shape their naturalization. 
  
The Role of Religion: Social Capital and Identity Formation 
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Religion is important for political integration in many immigrant-receiving contexts. In places 
like Saudi Arabia, India, and the United Arab Emirates, religious identity is so closely linked to 
national identity that the naturalization of religious minorities is highly restricted through 
formal mechanisms (Özev 2017; Searle-Chatterjee 2000). In most European countries, state 
secularism means that religious identity presents no legal barriers to naturalization, yet 
informally, Christians, Hindus, and Muslims from Africa and Asia experience many obstacles 
to political integration, stemming in part from the framing and application of secularism across 
Europe and in part from protectionist reactions to waves of minority laborers and refugees 
(Mooney 2013; Foner and Alba 2008; Bail 2008).  
In the United States, by contrast, religion is usually viewed as a politically integrative 
institution (Cadge and Ecklund 2007; Hirschman 2004). American organized religion is 
marked by congregationalism and voluntarism, which means that religious congregations are 
politically independent, functionally diffuse, widespread voluntary associations that engage in 
multiple types of social, civic, and philanthropic activities and are well positioned to connect 
foreign- and native-born populations (Warner 1997, 1994; Ammerman 2005). Immigrants to 
the United States are also proportionately more Christian and thus often share a cultural 
framework for religious membership with the native-born population (Pew Forum 2011).  
 Such religious-based integration is often theorized in terms of social capital and/or 
identity formation (Manglos-Weber 2018; Chen 2008; Foley and Hoge 2007; Warner 2007; 
Cadge and Ecklund 2007). The social capital argument is that religious involvement provides 
new relationships through which various civic and political resources flow (Connor 2011; 
Levitt 2008; Foley and Hoge 2007; Portes 1998). This perspective distinguishes between two 
types of social capital: bonding and bridging. Naturalization-relevant bonding capital is shared 
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within close homogenous ties found in immigrant or ethnic congregations and includes 
material and emotional support, shared experiences of the immigration system, and in some 
cases more formal instruction in English and legal aid (Hagan and Ebaugh 2003; Waters 1999; 
Warner 1997; Portes 1998). Bridging capital is shared within ties that cross social divides, as in 
diverse or native-born congregations, and can look like personal references or general civic 
knowledge (Levitt 2008; Foley and Hoge 2007).  
 The identity formation argument is that religious involvement can reflect and reinforce 
a developing sense of belonging in the United States (Chen 2008; Hirschman 2004; Herberg 
1983). Both immigrant and US-origin congregations can shape identity by acclimating 
newcomers to American lifestyles, habits, and styles of discourse to various degrees (Cadge 
and Ecklund 2007; Foley and Hoge 2007). Multi-generational immigrant congregations can 
also help bridge the gap between first and second generations by providing a moral framework 
that integrates elements of home and host cultures and forms new American or hyphenated 
identities (Portes and Rumbaut 2014:323; Chen 2006).  
Of course, it is possible that religious membership or identity can isolate newcomers 
within their own ethnic groups on the basis of “bounded solidarity” (Portes 1998), where ethnic 
congregational bonding limits connections to and identification with the host society (Breton 
1964). This argument has been heavily critiqued (Levitt 2008; Warner 1997; Herberg 1983), 
however, because it relies on an outdated zero-sum model of citizenship, belies the evidence of 
positive links between transnational connections and naturalization (Gershon and Pantoja 
2014), and ignores the organizational mobilizing that happens in immigrant congregations in 
response to discrimination, as discussed below (Warner 2007). Nonetheless, the debate 
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remains, in part because immigrant congregations do seem to solidify bonds between co-
ethnics, exert social control over members, and reinforce a sense of difference (Portes 1998).  
 
Religious Minorities: Segregation vs. Mobilization  
The threat of religious-based social segregation is likely to be particularly salient for those who 
are also religious minorities in the United States, especially Hindus, Buddhists, and Muslims. 
Such groups may feel particularly alienated by the current context of rising Islamophobia and 
Christian nationalism and historic patterns of racial and ethnic segregation (Sherkat and 
Lehman 2018; Braunstein 2017; Abrams 2014; Bakalian and Bozorgmeher 2009). Their 
religious organizations may also be less embedded in broader inter-organizational networks 
than Christian congregations and thus less likely to connect their members to new sources of 
social capital (Wuthnow and Hackett 2003).  
However, other evidence suggests that religious minority immigrants may be more 
likely to pursue citizenship through group mobilization processes (Bakalian and Bozorgmeher 
2009; Kurien 2007; Rudrappa 2004). While such religious minorities may indeed experience 
cultural and political discrimination, they may in response be motivated to collectively pursue 
naturalization as a form of protective citizenship (Gilbertson and Singer 2003), laying claim to 
political membership while maintaining ethnic distinctiveness (Warner 2007). For example, 
Muslim immigrant communities seek citizenship as a reaction to Islamophobia (Williams 
2011; Bakalian and Bozorgmeher 2009), and Hindus collectively pursue hyphenated Indian-
American identities within the context of their ethno-religious organizations (Rudrappa 2004). 
This theory is actually more in line with the experience of religious “others” in earlier eras, 
9 
 
such as Jews and Catholics, who assimilated not by discarding their religious identities but by 
crafting a dual identity and mobilizing group resources for incorporation (Herberg 1983).  
Of course, it is difficult to parse out the effects of minority ethnic status from minority 
religious status. While religion and ethnicity often overlap in the United States, they are also 
increasingly “de-coupled” (Kurien 2012) through conversion processes, where large minority 
groups like Indians, Koreans, and Chinese encompass those of both majority Christian and 
minority faiths (Chen 2008; Ebaugh and Yang 2001). Again, while we might expect being a 
minority on both dimensions to further limit integration, being part of an ethno-religious 
subculture may provide a more effective basis of mobilization, as already described (Bakalian 
and Bozorgmehr 2009).  
The above discussion therefore suggests that distinct immigrant groups—highly 
educated professionals vs. vulnerable workers and Christians vs. religious minorities—may 
experience different religious influences on citizenship, as theorized by the social capital, 
identity formation, minority segregation, and minority mobilization frameworks. The current 
study assesses the evidence for these different frameworks, accounting for differences in 
religious involvement, as well as interactions with human capital, income, and years in the 
United States, and finally differences between ethno-religious subgroups. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Hypotheses and Aims 
This article speaks to the debate over religion as an integrative institution by testing the 
evidence for the distinct frameworks discussed above (See Table 1). 
[Table 1 about here] 
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First is the main hypothesis (H1a) that religious membership is positively associated with 
naturalization. I also expect a stronger effect for regular attendees at their congregations (H1b), 
since those who invest more in congregations generally reap more civic and political benefits 
(Levitt 2008; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006). While regular congregational attendance is in some 
ways specific to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, it has become a more common practice 
among immigrant Buddhists and Hindus, in response to immigrant communities’ unique needs 
(Yang and Ebaugh 2001). I also expect a stronger relationship for those who have been in the 
United States longer and have more exposure to its religious institutions (H1c). 
Next, the social capital framework focuses on the importance of congregational 
resource exchange. This framework supports the hypothesis that those in national-origin 
congregations will be more likely to obtain citizenship than those in other types of 
congregations (H2a), since social capital seems to be more regularly and abundantly shared 
across in-group bonding ties (Manglos-Weber 2018; Portes 1998; Warner 1997). Since new 
social capital seems logically to be more pivotal for naturalization among immigrants with 
fewer existing resources, this framework also supports the hypothesis that any positive effect 
of religious membership on naturalization will be greater among immigrant with less human 
capital and income (H2b). 
Conversely, the identity formation framework focuses on how religious membership 
supports citizenship as part of adopting an American identity (Levitt 2008; Cadge and Ecklund 
2007). Although American identities are plural and can be supported by ethnic congregational 
membership, there is still likely to be a stronger pull toward an Americanized identity within 
mostly US-origin congregations (Manglos-Weber 2018; Kurien 2012). Thus, this framework 
supports the hypothesis that those in US-origin congregations will be more likely to naturalize 
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than those in other kinds of congregations (H3a). It also suggests that the link between 
religious membership and naturalization will be stronger among those with more human capital 
and income (H3b), since these groups are more likely to attend US-origin congregations 
(Manglos-Weber 2018; Foley and Hoge 2007) and their naturalization pathways are likely 
more reliant on shifts in identity than access to new resources, as suggested above. 
Next, the minority segregation and minority mobilization frameworks support opposite 
expectations for the association between religious minority status and naturalization (H4a and 
H4b). Such associations could also be moderated by membership in a congregation (H4b and 
H5b) and could depend on ethnicity or nationality: whether, for example, one is a Latin 
American Christian or East Asian Christian, Asian Buddhist or Asian Christian. In the 
following, therefore, I also perform subgroup analyses by place of origin and religion, to the 
extent allowed by the data.  
 
Data Selection and Analytic Sample Construction 
 
Testing the theories and hypotheses shown in Table 1 is challenging because most surveys do 
not have sufficient numbers of foreign-born for complex comparisons and because surveys of 
immigrants tend to underrepresent the most transient groups (Massey and Bartley 2005; Jasso 
et al 2000). Surveys with large enough numbers to study immigrants also do not usually have 
detailed questions on religious membership, attendance, identity, or congregational 
demographics, making it challenging to treat religion in a multidimensional way (Akresh 2011; 
Cadge and Ecklund 2006).   
 Given these limitations, this article uses the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) as the best 
possible data for getting a preliminary look at the relationship between religion and 
naturalization. The NIS is a panel study of immigrants who obtained the status of legal 
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permanent resident (LPR) between May and November 2003. Some of these immigrants were 
new arrivals, while others had lived in the United States for some time. The NIS sampling 
frame included 12,500 adults. Of these, 8,573 completed the baseline survey, for a response 
rate of 68.6 percent. My independent variables come from Wave 1, conducted in 2003 and 
2004, and my measure of citizenship comes from Wave 2, conducted from June 2007 to 
December 2009, with 3,974 total cases in the analytic sample (48.2 percent retention from 
Wave 1).1  
Analyses of the New Immigrant Survey Pilot (NIS-P) suggest that at least in the 
survey’s first wave, patterns of nonresponse did not produce significant bias in the sample 
(Jasso et al 2000). Yet it is possible that attrition by the second wave introduced bias toward 
the more stable members of the immigrant population, precisely those who are better 
positioned for citizenship. In addition, although the data are longitudinal, the time span 
between waves is fairly short, at 3.5 to 7 years (43 to 83 months). The mandatory waiting 
period between LPR status and citizenship is 3 years for spouses of US citizens, 4 years for 
certain political refugees, and 5 years for all others, which means a fair number of those in the 
sample were not eligible to apply for citizenship by wave 2.2  
For the above reasons, the following analyses cannot truly claim representativeness for 
all new immigrants, legal or not, and are much more generalizable to those who gain 
citizenship more easily and rapidly (i.e., highly educated English speakers, spouses of citizens, 
 
1 I found that missingness on many of these variables correlated with the other predictors, suggesting the data 
were missing not at random (MNAR), with patterns of missing data dependent on observed factors in the model. 
Many would choose to use multiple imputation in this instance (Porter and Ecklund 2012), but I chose not to, 
partly because the low retention rate means imputing the majority of the data and partly because only 4.7 percent 
of the cases with information on citizenship were lost through listwise deletion.  
2 Because it is not possible to establish eligibility for each individual case, I continue to use the entire sample, 
rather than limiting it to those who were eligible, while controlling for years passed since obtaining LPR status. I 
also test how this choice impacts the results in sensitivity analyses. 
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those who had already been living in the United States, and those of African or Asian origin) 
(Witsman 2017; Portes and Rumbaut 2014). Nonetheless, the NIS is still the best data available 
on the topic, given its large sample, multiple measures of religion, and longitudinal design. The 
findings are thus valuable and highly suggestive, notwithstanding their limitations, and are 
likely to underestimate religion’s true influence, which should accumulate over time rather 
than be limited to the short window of 3.5-7 years post LPR status (more on this below).  
 
Measures: Description and Coding 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the original and analytic samples. Table 3 shows the 
same statistics for all religion variables, as well as percentages of religious membership, 
categories of religious attendance, membership/attendance in US-origin congregations, and 
membership/attendance in national-origin congregations across faith traditions.  
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
Citizenship. In the wave 2 survey, adults were asked whether they had obtained citizenship in a 
series of questions probing their marital and legal status. I used these data to construct a 
dichotomous variable of having obtained citizenship, which resulted in 457 cases of 
naturalization by the study’s second round, or about 12 percent of the analytic sample. This 
percentage reflects the short timeframe between waves discussed above. 
Religious membership. All respondents were asked, “Do you presently consider yourself to be 
a member of a specific church, parish, temple, synagogue, or mosque in the United States?” 
This variable is dichotomous, where those who respond yes are coded as “1.” Respondents 
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were also asked an identical question in wave 2, which I use for sensitivity analyses to assess 
changes in religious membership between waves 1 and 2.  
Religious attendance. Respondents were asked how many times they had attended religious 
services since obtaining LPR status. From this variable, I created a categorical measure of 
attendance by dividing this count variable by the number of months since obtaining LPR status 
and coding as “0” those who reported no attendance (non-attendees), “1” those who attended 
an average of less than 4 times a month (irregular attendees), and “2” those who attended an 
average of 4 times a month or more (regular attendees).3  
Congregation demographics. Respondents who reported either being a member of a 
congregation or attending services since becoming an LPR were then asked follow-up 
questions about the congregation where they attended most often. They were asked what 
percent of adults in that congregation came from the United States and what percent of adults 
were from their origin country. Assuming respondents did not have exact knowledge of the 
nationalities of all their fellow members and given that distributions of these variables cluster 
at round number values (i.e. 20, 50, 90, and 100), I interpret responses as general estimates of 
how respondents perceived their congregations and used them to create two separate 
categorical variables of simple majorities.  
Each of these measures has three categories: those who were religious members or 
attendees at the type of congregation (i.e., US-origin or national-origin), those who were 
religious members or attendees at other types of congregations (coded “2”), and those who 
reported no membership or attendance (coded “0” as the reference category). The “don’t 
 
3“Regular” is interpreted as about weekly, though notably this is an average rather than a measure of “weekly 
attendance.” This interpretation helps assuage concerns about attendance being an indication of involvement 
relevant only to certain traditions. Still, regular attendance may be less relevant to religions like Hinduism, where 
religious practice centers more on the home and special festivals (Kurien 2007).   
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know” responses made up 13.3 percent of cases on the immigrant-origin variable and 18.4 
percent of cases on the US-origin variable. I coded these with the other congregation category 
(“2”) to avoid a significant loss of data and on the basis of what we know about them – 
namely, that they were religiously involved but not sure of their congregations’ demographics. 
The end result is identical to imputing their values as the mean or median of the original 
variable. These decisions are evaluated in sensitivity analyses.  
Religious tradition. All adult respondents were asked, “What religious tradition, if any, 
describes your current religion?” I use the categories provided on the questionnaire but group 
“Jewish” with the “Other” category, given the small number of cases. This practice is 
consistent with other recent studies of American religious demography (Pew Research Center 
2015; Portes and Rumbaut 2014:316), although it collapses Evangelical, Mainline, and Black 
Protestants into a single category. Compared to those studies, the NIS also has higher 
percentages of Orthodox Christians, Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists. In later analyses, I use a 
dummy measure of “religious majority,” coded as “1” for Protestants and Catholics and “0” for 
all others, to control for tradition in models where multicollinearity of the categorical religious 
tradition variable with region of birth is an issue.4 
 As shown in Table 3, faith traditions vary in religious involvement patterns. Protestants 
have high levels of membership, regular attendance, and involvement in US congregations. 
Muslims have low levels of involvement by all measures, and a small percent are in national-
origin congregations. This last finding is likely because the question is worded, “What percent 
of members are from your same country-of-origin?” and because Muslim congregations in the 
 
4 Orthodox Christianity is admittedly difficult to classify. In one sense, it is a Christian tradition and thus could be 
grouped with Protestantism and Catholicism. In another sense, Orthodox believers are heavily concentrated in 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Northeastern Africa, and their organizations in the United States tend to have a 
strong ethnic character. For these reasons I group them as a minority faith. 
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United States are often multinational and multiethnic (Williams 2011; Bakalian and 
Bozorgmehr 2009). Similarly, Latinx congregations can be diverse in terms of origin country, 
even if predominantly immigrant (Marti 2012), which points to a limitation of this measure. 
Also notable are Hindus’ low percentages of membership and regular attendance and high 
percentage in national-origin congregations, reflecting the linkage of Hinduism and Indian 
nationality.  
Other controls. Following earlier analyses of the NIS (Connor 2011; Frank, Akresh, 
and Lu 2010), I control for visa category (family reunification, employment diversity, 
refugee/asylee, and other)5 and control for place of origin divided into eight regions (see Table 
1). The largest origin countries—Mexico, China, and India—are analyzed as independent 
categories. To measure human capital, I include a dichotomous measure for whether they 
spoke English well or very well and whether they had a Bachelor’s (BA) degree or higher. I 
control for income quartile as a categorical variable of high, median, and low income, pegged 
to the median yearly wages of the total US population from the 2005 Community Survey 
($27,299), and derived from the NIS-provided income variable. The median category included 
those with earnings between $20,000 and $35,000, or roughly $7,000 below or above the 
median. I also include a measure of years spent in the United States and years passed between 
obtaining LPR status and the wave 2 survey, as well as a measure of sex and a three-category 
measure of birth year that divides respondents into those born before 1950, between 1950 and 
1970, and since 1970.6 
 
5 This four-category measure exhibited less multicollinearity in the full multivariate models than a seven-category 
measure that included spousal sponsorship, other family sponsorship, employment, diversity, refugee, and 
legalization categories separately. 
6 I measure age in this way since the public NIS data provide data on birth year separated into 5-year periods. The 
condensed three-category measure exhibits less collinearity in the models. 
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In ancillary models I tested controls of marital status, race, number of children, and 
employment status (full-time, part-time, unemployed, homemaker, and other), but these 
controls inflated the variances for key variables (English-speaking ability, income, age, and 
years in the United States) due to multicollinearity. The main associations were also not 
affected by their removal, and in nested regression analysis, none of these omitted controls 
significantly improved model fit (measured by the Wald chi-squared statistic). 
 
Analytic Strategy 
The following results are from weighted logistic regression analysis with robust standard 
errors. The NIS-provided probability weights adjust to some degree for patterns of attrition 
from the original sampling frame, and logistic regression is appropriate for dichotomous 
outcomes like achieving citizenship. Other studies using the NIS have treated it as a multi-level 
dataset, with cases nested within origin countries, and used fixed effects or conditional effects 
models (Connor 2011). I opted not to use multi-level models because my interest is primarily 
in main effects rather than origin-country variation and because, as I show in later sensitivity 
analyses, these main effects do not differ greatly from the multi-level mixed effects model to 
the basic logistic regression model.  
From the results I compute marginal probabilities of naturalization within the 
designated 3.5-7 year timeframe across relevant subgroups as a more fruitful way of 
interpreting the findings, given that population-level effects can obscure internal variations and 
odds ratios can overstate the magnitude of effects when the outcome is less common. I then 
present path models from simultaneous equations to visualize direct and indirect effects, as a 
version of generalized structural equation models (Acock 2013). Finally, I test the mediation 
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pathways from these models, using a bootstrapping method that decomposes the total effect 
into direct and indirect effects, allows for control variables, and does not assume a normal 
distribution (Buis 2010).  
 
RESULTS 
Religious Membership and Integration  
The results shown in Table 4 examine the effects for religious membership and attendance. 
Model 1 includes just religious membership, and Model 2 adds the categorical attendance 
variable, as well as the dichotomous measure of being Protestant/Catholic Christian. I include 
this dummy variable to control somewhat for religious tradition, in lieu of the religious 
tradition variable that is collinear with birth region. These models also show direct effects for 
all controls. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Not surprisingly, LPR category exhibits large and significant effects on (early) naturalization. 
Those gaining LPR status via employment sponsorship or the diversity lottery are much less 
likely to obtain citizenship within this short window than those gaining LPR status through 
family reunification, while those entering as refugees/asylees are more likely to do so. 
Otherwise, age is a major predictor of quickly obtaining citizenship, likely because those of 
working age are more motivated to pursue naturalization for its professional and personal 
benefits. English proficiency and having a BA are both associated with the likelihood of 
naturalization, as expected, although income does not demonstrate a separate direct effect.  
 Pertinent to Hypothesis 1a, religious membership also demonstrates a sizeable effect, 
on par with having a BA. It does not change with the inclusion of the attendance or religious 
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majority variables, though the latter measure shows a significant negative association with 
naturalization (a result I return to below). As evidence for whether membership and attendance 
work in concert to support early naturalization, as hypothesized (H1b), Figure 1 shows the 
predicted probabilities and confidence intervals for groups split by membership and 
attendance, from a supplemental model that includes an interaction term. The legend of this 
figure also includes the number of cases in each category as a reference point for 
contextualizing the varying confidence intervals. 
[Figure 1 here] 
The steady increase in the point estimates of marginal probabilities of naturalization suggests 
that the effects of membership and attendance are indeed additive and roughly equally 
important contributors to the overall increase. However, given the size of the confidence 
intervals, the only statistically significant difference is that between nonmembers/non-
attendees and members/regular attendees, where the latter see a relative increase of .092 in the 
probability of naturalization. For reference, the predicted probability of naturalization in the 
whole sample is .153.    
 The next hypothesis (H1c) suggests that due to cumulative exposure to religious 
institutions, the effect of religious membership on naturalization will be even greater among 
those who have lived in the United States longer. Figure 2 plots the probabilities of 
naturalization for religious members vs. nonmembers across years of living in the United 
States. The gap does increase between 1 and 20 years, although it is really between 2 and 12 
years that the difference is large and significant. Again, as a reference point, this finding means 
religious membership is associated with an increase of .093 in the probability of naturalization 
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for those who have been in the United States 12 years, as compared to an increase of .062 for 
those who have been in the country less than 1 year. 
[Figure 2 about here]  
Sensitivity analyses. I next test whether religious membership’s direct effect is robust to certain 
coding and modeling choices. The beta coefficient, standard error, and corresponding increase 
in the probability of naturalization for the direct effects of religious membership are shown in 
Table 5, along with the Wald chi-square statistic for each model.  
[Table 5 about here] 
The first set of checks concerns differences in the LPR population. I first separate the sample 
into new arrivals and those adjusting their status to LPR. The latter group demonstrates a 
significant effect similar to the overall model, while the former group, new arrivals, have a 
similar effect size but also a large standard error which renders the effect not statistically 
significant. This finding is in line with the results above that suggest the biggest differences are 
between members and nonmembers who had lived in the United States for two or more years. I 
then check the effect on a limited sample for whom the mandatory waiting period had likely 
been met by wave 2 (i.e., 3 years for spouses of US citizens, 4 years for refugees/asylees, and 5 
years for everyone else), again with similar results.  
The second set of checks regards the issue of origin-country based heteroscedasticity. I 
check the effect from a multilevel model, specifically a generalized mixed effects model 
estimated using adaptive quadrature (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondahl, and Pickles 2002), and a 
logistic regression model that controls for origin country rather than origin region. Both show 
similar results for the effects and standard errors. The third set of checks regards missing data. 
I check the effect from an identical model where I code the “don’t know” responses as missing 
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rather than “0,” with little change. I also run an identical model where predictors’ missing data 
are imputed using multiple imputation with chained equations (exact syntax of imputation 
models available by request). Results are again similar.  
Finally, I include a wave 2 measure of religious membership to check for the influence 
of membership changes between waves 1 and 2. In these data, joining between waves is more 
common: 16.7 percent of the overall sample transitioned from nonmembers to members 
between waves, while 7.6 percent transitioned from members to nonmembers. This finding 
suggests that both wave 1 and wave 2 membership matter and that much, though not all, of the 
influence of wave 1 membership could be mediated through wave 2 membership.  
 
Social Capital vs. Identity Formation  
To test the social capital and identity formation frameworks, I first examine the interactions of 
religious membership with human capital (education and English-speaking ability) and income 
(H2b and H3b), as this step in the analysis builds directly on the proceeding models. Figure 3 
includes three graphs of predicted probabilities from models with interaction terms: religious 
membership by income category, religious membership by having a higher degree, and 
religious membership by English-speaking ability. All three support the conclusion that 
religious membership has a significant association with early naturalization only among those 
with higher levels of human capital and income, supporting Hypothesis 3b rather than 2b. 
[Figure 3 here] 
The social capital and identity formation frameworks also differ in which type of congregation 
they suggest will have a stronger association with naturalization: national-origin congregations 
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(H2a) or US-origin congregations (H3a). Table 6 compares the direct effects of these two 
measures and the corresponding change in the probability of naturalization. 
[Table 6 about here] 
In line with previous results, the largest and most significant effect is for 
membership/attendance at a US-origin congregation, although there are small, marginally 
significant effects for being in a national-origin congregation as well. Being in a majority US-
origin congregation is associated with an increase of .102 in the probability of early 
naturalization over those who are not religiously involved, much greater than the increase of 
between .041 and .032 for other types of congregations.  
Sensitivity analyses. To test the robustness of the US-origin congregation effect, I compare it to 
models (not shown) where 1) “don’t know” responses are coded as missing and 2) cutoffs for a 
congregational majority are set to 60, 70, and 80 percent. In the first test, the effect stays stable, 
with a coefficient of .886 and a corresponding 0.104 increase in the probability of 
naturalization. In the second test, the effects again change little, with coefficients between.791 
and .903.  
Minority Segregation vs. Mobilization Hypotheses 
The opposing frameworks of minority segregation and minority mobilization suggest that 
religious minority status will be negatively (H4a) or positively (H5a) associated with 
naturalization. Table 7 first shows effects for separate faith traditions and then for the collapsed 
religious minority variable.  
[Table 7 about here] 
Although only two of these traditions show significant associations with early naturalization in 
Model 1, they all have positive coefficients, and the religious minority category has a 
23 
 
substantively and statistically significant positive relationship with naturalization (Model 2). 
To test the second set of paired hypotheses about the interaction of membership with minority 
status (H4b and H5b), Model 3 includes those interaction terms shown as group-specific 
coefficients. Being a member of a religious congregation does not seem to make much of a 
difference for religious minorities: the only significant difference is among nonmembers, 
where those who were not minorities were much less likely to naturalize. Thus, although 
Hypothesis 5a receives strong support (i.e., minorities are more likely to naturalize), 
Hypothesis 5b about membership’s additive role does not.  
Subgroup analyses. To understand what these numbers mean for those with different ethnic 
and religious identity configurations, I perform a bivariate analysis of religious membership 
and naturalization separately across meaningful subgroup categories. I show groups that have 
at least 50 cases in these data and that have internal validity as meaningful categories of 
belonging (based on the body of immigration research cited earlier) and conduct bivariate 
analyses when there are at least 5 cases in each cell. The limiting factor is the small numbers in 
each subgroup that are both religious members and naturalized citizens. Results are shown in 
Table 8. 
[Table 8 about here] 
A few patterns stand out. First, although this dataset is large and has reasonable representation 
of religious minorities, small cell numbers still make it difficult to test the statistical 
significance of correlations for each subsample. Among those with large enough numbers, two 
groups—Latin/Central American Catholics and Sub-Saharan African Christians—illustrate 
significant correlations between religious membership and early naturalization.  
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 Second, almost all groups that are both ethnic and religious minorities have higher than 
average percentages of citizens. These groups are European/Central Asian Orthodox 
Christians, North African/Middle Eastern Muslims, Indian Hindus, Chinese with No Religion, 
and East/Southeast Asian Buddhists. Notably, however, they all have very low rates of 
religious membership and attendance (see Table 2). Thus, it seems likely these ethno-religious 
minority groups have attributes that support quickly obtaining citizenship but that do not work 
through organized religion—or at least, not the congregational type of organized religion.    
 
Path Models 
The above results suggest two distinct pathways linking religion to early naturalization: the 
first works through identity formation, primarily within US-origin congregations and among 
those with more human capital and wealth, and the second works through mobilization on the 
basis of religious minority status. To visualize these pathways and to evaluate how the religion 
variables mediate the effects of human capital, time in the United States, and religious minority 
status on naturalization, Figure 4 shows a path model including just these measures of interest, 
based on simultaneous weighted logistic regression equations that also include the other 
controls. To include both the religious membership and US-origin congregation variables in the 
same model, I recode the latter as a dichotomous variable, rather than a three-category variable 
that separates out nonmembers/attendees. Note that while income is included in these models, 
it does not have significant direct effects on citizenship or religious membership, so the results 
are not shown. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
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This model shows significant direct effects for speaking English well, having a BA degree, 
being a religious member, being in a US-origin congregation, and being a religious minority. It 
shows indirect effects for English-speaking ability via religious membership and US-origin 
congregation; having a BA degree via US-origin congregation; and years in the United States 
via religious membership and, to a lesser extent, being in a US-origin congregation. Religious 
minority status has a strong negative association with both measures of involvement in 
organized religion, along with a strong positive association with early naturalization, affirming 
the earlier results. 
 Because assumptions about normally distributed variances do not hold for logistic 
regression, testing mediation is more complex and requires an effects-decomposition method 
(Buis 2010). In Table 9, I report the indirect, direct, and total effects for each possible 
mediation pathway, as well as the indirect effect/total effect (IE/TE) statistic, which translates 
to the percent of the total effect attributed to the mediation pathway. A negative value for this 
statistic indicates a suppressor effect. 
[Table 9 about here] 
There is strong evidence of mediation in several instances: religious membership mediating the 
effects of English-speaking ability, as well as living in the United States between 1 and 5 years 
(relative to living in the United States less than 1 year); and the US-origin congregation 
mediating the effects of English-speaking ability and education, as well as living in the United 
States between 1 and 5 years. These measures are also strong suppressors for the effects of 
religious minority status on early naturalization. 
  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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The current study was motivated by debates over whether organized religion integrates or 
alienates immigrants from political membership in receiving nations. The narrative of religion 
as an integrative force has been influential in American scholarship (Warner 2007, 1997; 
Herberg 1983; Gordon 1964), as compared to other receiving regions like Europe and parts of 
Asia, where religion is more often viewed as an obstacle to political integration (Özev 2017; 
Mooney 2013; Searle-Chatterjee 2000). The United States is distinct from many other 
immigrant-receiving nations in its degree of religious membership, in that its religious 
organizations are voluntary and functionally diffuse associations with inter- and intra-
organizational connections to the broader society, and in that most immigrants are Christian 
and thus share a framework for religious membership with the native-born majority (Manglos-
Weber 2018; Levitt 2008; Warner 2007, 1994; Ammerman 2005). 
Yet there is also a counter-narrative of religious-based alienation in the United States, 
focusing on how religion reinforces anti-immigrant hostility and social segregation (Albanese 
2012:302-316; Portes 1998; Breton 1964). This narrative cites the hostility toward religious 
minorities in earlier areas (in particular Jews, Buddhists, and Catholics), the steady rise of new 
religious minorities (Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists), evidence of racial 
and ethnic segregation in American religion more generally, and the rise in Christian 
nationalism and Islamophobia in the past two decades (Sherkat and Lehman 2018; Braunstein 
2017; Wuthnow and Hackett 2003). This narrative suggests that by reinforcing racial, ethnic, 
and religious group boundaries, religious membership is likely to reinforce immigrants’ sense 
of alienation from US society and the segmentation in their networks, inhibiting their political 
incorporation. 
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It has been difficult to adjudicate between these two narratives, in part because they 
both have case-study and historical evidence to support them and in part because there has 
been a lack of comparative population-level data to test their assumptions. The current study is 
thus an important intervention in this debate, as the first large-N comparative test of which 
narrative has more evidence to support it within and between diverse new immigrant 
populations in the United States.  
My central finding is that among new legal permanent residents (LPRs), membership in 
a religious congregation is generally associated with a higher probability of naturalization 
within a short timeframe. However, the association does not hold for everyone. It is strong and 
statistically significant for those who had lived in the United States for longer than a year and 
strongest for those who lived in the United States for 2-11 years before adjusting their status to 
LPR. The association is also stronger for those who were also regular attendees at their 
congregations, suggesting that it is heightened by greater congregational involvement.  
At the same time, the association is only strong and statistically significant for those 
with more human capital and income, suggesting it is primarily relevant to the more privileged 
(i.e., highly educated professionals). This finding is corroborated by others, specifically that 
while members/attendees at US-origin congregations were much more likely to naturalize 
(with an increased probability of .102), members/attendees at national-origin congregations 
were only marginally more likely to do so. Finally, there is a parallel finding that religious 
minorities—Orthodox Christians, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists—were as a group more 
likely to obtain citizenship within this short window of time. This, despite the fact they were 
also much less likely to report membership in a religious congregation, and that their higher 
likelihood of naturalization does not seem to be moderated by religious membership.  
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   The path analysis confirms these results: religious membership, being in a US-origin 
congregation, and being a religious minority each have separate positive effects on the 
probability of naturalization, and being a religious minority also has a separate negative effect 
on being a member of a congregation or in a US.-origin congregation. This analysis also 
confirms the conjoined role of human capital, tenure in the United States, and religion, where 
the latter—in particular, being in a US-origin congregation—mediates the factors that already 
put certain immigrants in a privileged place vis-a-vis naturalization.  
There is therefore a fair amount of support for the religion-as-integrative position. 
However, there is less support for understanding this relationship in terms of social capital, at 
least among the early naturalizers studied here. The results suggest that religion is more 
important in the naturalization pathways of more privileged immigrants and those who attend 
US-origin congregations. Although these data cannot measure American identification directly, 
when viewed in light of other literature (Levitt 2008; Warner 2007; Hirshman 2004), these 
results seem indicative of how religious membership assists in the formation of a US-based 
identity, for those who experience fewer material obstacles to political integration.  
The findings also show that religious minority status supports naturalization, which also 
affirms the role of human capital. The largest religious minority groups in these data are 
European/Central Asian Orthodox, Indian Hindu, East/Southeast Asian Buddhist, and North 
African/Middle Eastern Muslim. These communities are from places like Russia, Ukraine, 
India, Vietnam, South Korea, Pakistan, and Egypt and are generally characterized by higher-
than-average education and earnings (Portes and Rumbaut 2014). Thus, the religious minority 
effect may also reflect these socioeconomic differences.   
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The importance of socioeconomic standing does not mean, however, that religious 
identity is unimportant; rather, the literature on such groups suggests that their ethno-religious 
identity provides a foundation for constructing distinctive categories of political belonging 
(Williams 2011; Bakalian and Bozorgmehr 2009; Rudrappa 2004). The findings of the current 
study are thus in line with the selective acculturation model, characterized by upward mobility 
and the development of a distinct hyphenated American identity (Portes and Rumbaut 2014:75; 
Warner 2007), and with studies of protective citizenship (Gilberston and Singer 2003). By 
adding to this literature, I provide further evidence that minority religious identities can 
facilitate individual and joint mobilization of resources to obtain citizenship, especially in 
reaction to anti-immigrant sentiment, Christian nationalism, and interracial hostility. 
If Indian Americans are the quintessential example of this minority mobilization 
process (Rudrappa 2004), then African Protestant/Catholic Christians seem to be the 
quintessential example of the identity formation process. They are the one subgroup in these 
data exhibiting a strong positive correlation between religious membership and citizenship; 
they tend to have more human capital as a result of selection processes; they tend to gravitate 
toward US-based multicultural congregations; and their religious practices are in many ways 
similar to mainstream religious practice in the United States, especially among Evangelical or 
Pentecostal Protestants (Manglos-Weber 2018; Glick Schiller and Çaglar 2008; Foley and 
Hoge 2007). At the same time, the results for this group provide further evidence of minority 
mobilization, in that they are visible ethnic minorities as Blacks. They may therefore also 
pursue naturalization as part of selective acculturation and protective citizenship, rooted in 
cultural frameworks of Africana or Black Christianity (Abrams 2014).  
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Notably, the major share of new immigrants—those with less human capital and 
income, who largely come from Christian areas of the Americas—are not well represented by 
these narratives. Data challenges limit my ability to evaluate those groups. They are more 
likely to be lost from the sample due to attrition, they take longer to obtain citizenship, and 
they tend to have less human capital and wealth than average (Portes and Rumbaut 2014; 
Logan, Oh, and Darrah 2012). For them, any positive effects of religious membership due to 
congregational social capital would likely show up later than 7 years after becoming LPRs. 
Hopefully, panel data over a longer period of time, with similar religion measures and good 
representation across the diversity of new immigrants, will soon be available. 
Also, there are likely unmeasured differences in acculturation shaping whether and 
where new immigrants practice religion in the United States. Some newcomers may have spent 
time interacting with friends and family in the United States and consuming US culture before 
entry, making it easier for them to be involved with US-based religious organizations. One 
could therefore argue that attending a US-origin congregation may be endogenous to general 
acculturation processes. Yet given this article’s findings on mediation pathways, it seems better 
to frame US-origin congregational involvement as a mediator that further supports the 
identification process of those already more acculturated to the United States. 
Another weakness of this study is the measures of congregational demographics 
available on the NIS, which, while unique and valuable, cannot clearly differentiate between 
multiethnic immigrant congregations and more generally diverse congregations or between 
immigrant congregations that have a mix of first-, second-, and third-generation members and 
congregations that have no immigrant or ethnic character. The questions focus on national 
origin, but some congregations have a shared ethnic character but are multinational, like many 
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Latinx or West African congregations, while still others are “national” in their character but 
multigenerational, like many Chinese or Korean churches. As noted, too, many respondents did 
not know or report their congregational demographics, and these cases are conservatively 
placed in the “other” category. The upshot is that this study’s results are most likely 
conservative and suggestive of influences of organized religiosity on naturalization that go 
beyond what I can confidently establish.  
Similarly, this study’s religious attendance variable is more meaningful to traditions 
following a congregational model. While as noted, some minority faiths have adopted this 
model as part of their interaction with American religious culture (Yang and Ebaugh 2001), 
they are still—as Table 3 shows—less likely to report regular attendance. There might be other 
measures of attendance or involvement that are more appropriate to those groups, such as 
practices taking place in the home and centering around yearly festivals (Chen 2008; Kurien 
2007; Warner 1997), which might also moderate the link between religious membership or 
tradition and naturalization. It remains to future studies to test this possibility. 
 Finally, although this study’s results are preliminary, the role of religious organizations 
in political integration is germane to public discussions of these matters. It is ironic that 
religious identity is both a motivator of anti-immigration sentiment and a facilitator of 
integration, but such seems to be the ongoing story of the United States (Sherkat and Lehman 
2018; Braunstein 2017; Warner 2007). In addition to the many domestic religious 
organizations that directly aid in refugee resettlement and have openly resisted the reduction in 
quotas and rises in forceful deportations of recent decades, local immigrant-serving 
congregations are in many places the strongest civic “connectors” for new arrivals (Cadge et al. 
2013; Levitt 2008; Warner 2007; Hagan and Ebaugh 2003). Such organizations are thus likely 
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to have insight into the needs of new populations and should be included in the important 
project of immigration policy reform.     
 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the current study suggest that organized religion in the United States aids new 
immigrants in the process of naturalizing within a quick (3.5-7 year) timeframe. In light of a 
robust extant literature, I interpret these findings to suggest that organized religion shapes 
citizenship primarily through its identity formation functions, as seen most notably in the 
association between US-origin congregational membership and early naturalization. Further, 
being a religious minority illustrates a similar but separate positive effect on naturalization, 
which I interpret as aligned with other evidence of ethno-religious community mobilization in 
response to anti-immigrant hostility and discrimination (Williams 2011; Bakalian and 
Bozorgmehr 2009; Rudrappa 2004).  
Organized religion thus matters for how today’s new legal residents in the United States 
are naturalized, but not as a legal boundary that determines possibilities of citizenship or a 
cultural boundary that isolates new immigrants from political membership. Rather, religion 
matters in a more complex and nuanced way as a basis of membership and identification that 
helps accommodate the demands of life in the host society and, when necessary, protects 
against the threats of America’s stratified racial and ethnic order. This interpretation, rather 
than ignoring the experiences of minority groups or downplaying the effects of hostility and 
discrimination, accounts for how certain immigrants’ responses to those realities are also aided 
and informed by their personal religious commitments. What remains to be seen is whether 
organized religion also aids the less privileged in this process; whether it plays a similar role 
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for those in vulnerable legal categories; and whether new legal residents who naturalize more 
slowly will exhibit the same patterns.  
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